The Boeing 737-86N, registered SU-BPZ from Marsa Alam (Egypt), arrived at 21 h 25 at its parking space at area Q at Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport three hours late. During taxiing, the Captain asked the police to intervene to question a passenger who had smoked in the toilets. During the stopover, the co-pilot programmed the FMS for the following flight.
The Captain handled the police presence and asked the ground handling company agent to complete the weight and balance sheet.
The police left the airplane at around 22 h 15.
The crew listened to the ATIS, then the Captain keyed in the data to the OPT for the takeoff performance calculation.
He planned a take-off from runway 27L from taxiway Y11.
The dimensions of the runway were reduced by about one third because of construction at the runway end.
The airplane left its parking space for runway 27L at 22 h 45.
The Captain was PF. During taxiing, the ground controller proposed a line-up at Y12 or Y11. The crew indicated that they preferred to use Y11. The controller agreed and stated the remaining distance from this intersection.
As they approached Y11, the crew was cleared for takeoff by the LOC controller.
At the end of its takeoff run, the airplane struck some provisional runway end lights.
It continued its run and, during the rotation, hit some provisional plastic markers. Four markers were thrown towards the K2 taxiway. The airplane flew over the blast fence at a low height.
The crew realised that they had struck objects on the ground. They carried out a system and parameters review then decided to continue the flight to destination. The crew did not inform the controller of the anomalies encountered during take-off.
On 17 August 2008, at around 2 h 30 in the morning, flight BIE250 was cleared after landing to cross runway 27L via the K2 taxiway. The crew indicated to ATC that this was impossible, given the presence of debris ahead.
The ground controller initiated an inspection of the area, during which it was reported that several marker beacons from the works zone situated at the end of runway 27L were damaged.
A part from a B737-800 was also found among the debris.
The air traffic service informed the operators of all B737’s having taken off since the last runway inspection.
An AMC official then indicated that SU-BPZ had been damaged by FOD on the runway.
It was only several days after the event that information processing confirmed that SU-BPZ had struck the ground lighting during takeoff.
Calculations for the takeoff parameters were performed by the crew using the “OPT software” ; AMC had not established any procedures for the use of the OPT
The event was caused by the crew’s failure to take into account the length of the runway available for takeoff.
The following factors may have contributed to the event:
- the inadequacy of the OPT utilisation procedures set up by the operator AMC to prevent such an error;
- the impaired level of crew performance, specifically related to the pilots’ fatigue.