Itek Air flight IRC6895 was a flight from Bishkek to Teheran, flown on 24 August, 2008 with a Boeing 737-200 aircraft registered ЕХ-009 .
Souls onboard where the PIC plus co-pilot, cabin crew (3 persons) as well as 85 passengers including two service passengers: a maintenance engineer and a representative of the Iran Aseman Airlines.

ITEK AIR flight IRC6895

Itek Air flight IRC6895 was executed in compliance with the leasing agreement No. 023/05 of 15 July, 2005 for the Boeing 737-200 ЕХ-009 between the Kyrgyz airline, Itek Air, and the Iran Aseman Airlines.

The crew of Itek Air flight IRC6895 passed a medical examination in the ground medical office of Manas Airport. The crew did not have any complaints of their health. The crew received a complete preflight briefing.

The weather at the departure airport Manas, the destination airport and at alternate aerodromes was favourable for the flight.

Total fuel was 12000 kg, the takeoff weigh was 48371 kg with the CG at 24,8% MAC, which was within the B737-200 AFM limitations.

After the climb to approximately 3000 m the crew informed the ATC about a pressurization system fault and decided to return to the aerodrome of departure. While they were descending for visual approach the aircraft collided with the ground, was damaged on impact and burnt.

The cause of the Itek Air flight IRC6895 was a flight from Bishkek to Teheran, flown on 24 August, 2008 with a Boeing 737-200 aircraft registered ЕХ-009 . was due to the cabin not pressurizing (probably caused by the jamming of the left forward door seal).

The crew of Itek Air flight IRC6895 allowed the aircraft to descend at night to a lower than the minimum descent altitude for visual approach which resulted in the crash with damage to the aircraft followed by the fire and fatalities.

The combination of the following factors contributed to the accident:

• Deviations from the Boeing 737-200 SOP and PF/PM task sharing principles;
• Non-adherence to visual approach rules, as the crew did not keep visual contact with the runway and/or ground references and did not follow the prescribed procedures after they lost visual contact;
• Loss of altitude control during the missed approach (which was performed because the PIC incorrectly evaluated the aircraft position in comparison with the required descent flight path when he decided to perform visual straight-in approach);
• Non-adherence to the prescribed procedures after the TAWS warning was triggered.