Spanair flight JKK5022 was an MD82 (EC-HFP) that crashed in Madrid (Spain) on Aug. 20th 2008 : the aircraft stalled after liftoff and crashed : 17 passengers + 1 crew member survived the crash.
The crew lost control of the airplane as a consequence of entering a stall immediately after takeoff due to an improper airplane configuration involving the non-deployment of the slats/flaps following a series of mistakes and omissions, along with the absence of the improper takeoff configuration warning. The crew did not identify the stall warnings and did not correct said situation after takeoff.
the stall warning stick shaker activated, as well as the horn and synthetic voice warning of an aerodynamic stall.
They momentarily retarded the engine throttles, increased the pitch angle and did not correct the bank angle, leading to a deterioration of the stall condition. The crew did not detect the configuration error because they did not properly use the checklists, which contain items to select and verify the position of the flaps/slats when preparing the flight.
the crew did the “After Start” checklist, as recorded on the CVR. A total of eight items were read, but upon reaching the ninth and final item, Flaps & Slats, the captain interrupted the first officer before he could read it to ask him to request permission from ATC to taxi.
• They did not carry out the action to select the flaps/slats with the associated control lever (in the “After Start” checklist);
• They did not cross check the position of the lever or the status of the flaps and slats indicating lights when executing the “After Start” checklist;
• They omitted the check of the flaps/slats when doing the “Takeoff Briefing” in the “Taxi” checklist;
• During the visual check performed as part of the “Final Items” in the “Takeoff Imminent” checklist, the actual position of the flaps/slats as shown on the cockpit instruments was not verified.
The CIAIAC has identified the following contributing factors:
• The absence of a takeoff configuration warning resulting from the failure of the TOWS to operate, which thus did not warn the crew that the airplane’s takeoff configuration was not appropriate. The reason for the failure of the TOWS to function could not be reliably established.
• Improper crew resource management (CRM), which did not prevent the deviation from procedures in the presence of unscheduled interruptions to flight preparations.